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TARGETED KILLINGS OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS IN THE 
LIGHT OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE
JACQUELINE HELLMAN – RAQUEL REGUEIRO1
I. WHAT ARE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE OR UNMANNED AIRCRAFT 
SYSTEMS? - II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS WHEN PERPETRATING 
ARMED ATTACKS WITH UAS - III. ANALYSING ARTICLE 51 OF THE 
UN CHARTER - IV. IS THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY DULY 
ACCOMPLISHED? - V. CONCLUSIONS
ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to examine and discuss if the use of drones -when used as an 
offensive weapon to end the life of suspected terrorists- validly falls within the scope of application 
of Article 51 of the UN Charter. In order to do so, the requirements established by the mentioned 
Charter will be duly analysed. Consequently, we will be able to conclude if drones are or are not 
fulfi lling the legal requirements requested by the right of self-defence, adjusting in the latter case 
the interpretation of international law to the particular national interests of some countries.
KEYWORDS: drones, counter terrorism measures, self-defence, principle of proportionality. 
LOS ASESINATOS SELECTIVOS DE PRESUNTOS TERRORISTAS BAJO EL PRISMA 
DEL DERECHO A LA LEGÍTIMA DEFENSA
RESUMEN: El objetivo de este artículo consiste en examinar y discutir si el uso de aviones 
no tripulados -cuando se utilizan como estrategia para acabar con la vida de terroristas- queda 
enmarcado, válidamente, dentro del ámbito de aplicación del artículo 51 de la Carta de la ONU. 
Consecuentemente, los requisitos establecidos por la mencionada Carta serán debidamente 
analizados. Ello nos permitirá concluir si los drones cumplen o no con los requisitos legales 
exigidos -fundamentalmente- por el derecho a la legítima defensa, ajustando en caso contrario la 
interpretación del Derecho Internacional a los intereses nacionales de algunos países.
PALABRAS CLAVE: aviones no tripulados, medidas anti-terroristas, legítima defensa, principio 
de proporcionalidad. 
LES ASSASSINATS SÉLECTIFS DE TERRORISTES PRESUMÉS AU REGARD DU 
DROIT DE LA LÉGITIME DÉFENS E
RÉSUMÉ: Cet article a pour fi n l’analyse et la discussion de savoir si l’usage d’engins non pilotés, 
lorsqu’ils sont utilisés comme stratégie de guerre afi n d’éliminer des terroristes présumés, s’ajuste 
aux conditions marquées par l’article 51 de la Charte des Nations Unies. L’étude des exigences du 
droit de légitime défense permettra conclure si l’utilisation de drones telle qu’on la connaît de nos 
jours peut se justifi er au regard du droit à la légitime défense ou si, au contraire, l’interprétation faite 
1 Ph. D. Associate Professors, Department of  Law and Internacional Relations, FAculty of  Social 
Sciences and Communication, Universidad Europea de Madrid. 
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par certains pays ne se conforme pas à la lettre et l’esprit de la Charte des Nations Unies.
MOTS-CLÉS : engins non pilotés, mesures contre le terrorisme, légitime défense, principe de 
proportionnalité
I. WHAT ARE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE OR UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS?
Unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly known as drones, are aircrafts that do 
not have a human pilot. Within this context, the US Department of  Defense 
defi nes these peculiar planes as “powered, aerial vehicles that do not carry a human 
operator, use aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fl y autonomously or 
be piloted remotely, can be expandable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or 
non-lethal payload.”2 However, the UAV Association declared that the term 
“Unmanned Aircraft Systems” (UAS) is a more suitable one as it embraces 
all different aspects that compounds this vehicle.3
In any event, it is important to stress that this kind of  vehicle sustained by 
aerodynamic lift, without an on-board crew, cannot be considered a new invention. 
During the First World War, UAS were tested although not used in combat.4 In 
1926, a report carried out by the New York Times mentioned that planes, which 
navigated autonomously with a high level of  precision, were able to “blow a small 
town inside out.”5 Within the context of  the Second World War, another important 
step was taken regarding the topic hereby discussed, as the US Military “refi tted 
B-24 bombers fi lled to double capacity with explosives and guided by remote control 
devices to crash at selected targets in Germany and Nazi-controlled France.”6 After, 
throughout the Korean War and the Vietnam War, the US Armed Forces used 
UAVs for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) purposes. Further 
2 Cfr. BONE, E., BOLKCOM, C., “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress”, 
Report for Congress, 2003.
3 From our point of  view, UAS is an appropriate term as aircrafts with no pilot on board involves, 
among others, the use of  ground stations. Therefore, an adequate concept should not only refer to the 
air vehicle itself. 
4 Vid. Infra, footnote 17.
5 Information hereby provided: <http://www.thenation.com/article/166124/brief-history-
drones#>. Nevertheless, it has to be highlighted that those aircrafts were more similar to cruise 
missiles, although those nascent UAVs were designed with the intention of  using them further on, 
once they had fulfi lled their mission; a feature that strongly distinguishes from the formers.
6 Ibidem. However, the technology at that time used had strong defi ciencies, as they were not, strictly 
speaking, self-piloted during take-offs. In fact, it was when the plane reached a cruising altitude when 
the pilots had to parachute.
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on, as Jeremiah Gertler clarifi es, pilotless aircrafts were able to “deliver payloads 
and fl ew its fi rst fl ight test as an armed UAV in 2002.”7 We can assert without a 
doubt, that the US Government has played an important role in developing UAS. 
Nevertheless, Israel has carried out an outstanding work too. During the military 
operations that took place in Lebanon, in 1982, the referred country used UAS 
successfully for many operations, constituting a turning point in the development 
of  this kind of  technology.8
Nowadays, these aircrafts piloted through a remote pilot station or through an 
on-board computer9, are signifi cantly used -gaining, in many occasions, a heated 
reputation- in the military fi eld “[…] not only due to technological sophistication, 
but also due to perceived military requirements to support national objectives.”10 
Indeed, the military dimension of  drones is reaching, these days, unprecedented 
rates.11 The escalation of  violence after 9/11 crystallizes in, among others, large-
scale military attacks launched by the US military forces, through the use of  pilotless 
aircrafts, against presumed terrorists targets located, among other territories, in 
Afghanistan and Yemen. Likewise, in Pakistan, the US government has ordered 
drone missile strikes as a consequence of  the ineffective previous counter-terrorism 
measures there applied.12 Unfortunately, the implementation of  such technology at 
the beginning of  the new century grew at an outstanding rate, falling substantially 
since 2009. Be that as it may, we have to point out that “drone strikes are reported 
to occur almost once a day and target mainly six countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Yemen, Somalia, Libya and Gaza)”13, being US, Israel and UK, the countries 
7 Cfr. GERTLER, J., “US Unamanned Aerial Systems”, The Drone Wars of  the 21st Century: Costs and 
Benefi ts, Oxford University Press, 2014, at 29. 
8 Ibid. at 30. 
9 These planes still need to be guided by a pilot located in a pilot station -usually called as a ground 
control station- or through a pre-programmed fl ight plan. Nevertheless, in the following years, the idea 
is to produce aircrafts with capacity to take decisions, being the pilot only in charge of  monitoring what 
those are doing. Information hereby provided: <http://www.theuav.com>.
10 Information hereby provided: <http://isis-europe.eu/sites/default/fi les/publications-
downloads/esr63_perspectivesUAVs_Dec2012MH.pdf>.
11 Vid. BROOKS, R., “Drones and the International Rule of  Law”, Georgetown University Law Center, 
2013, 1-21, at 9. 
12 According to the information provided by The Guardian: “targeted killings have been a hallmark 
of  this administration’s counterterrorism strategy. Obama sharply increased the use of  armed 
drones (begun under George W Bush), which have conducted lethal strikes against alleged terrorists 
in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia”. Information hereby provided: <http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2014/may/23/obama-drone-speech-one-year-later>.
13 Ibidem.
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that have developed most this technology for mainly targeted killings14, notably 
trespassing the ISR’s area. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the utilization of  UAVs 
cannot only be regarded as a weapon-delivery system. This true statement is linked 
to the fact that drones are increasingly having multiple civil applications, such as 
fi re fi ghting, surveillance activities, etc.15, which will surely “foster job creation and 
a source for innovation and economic growth for the years to come”16, as the 
European Commission has envisaged.
Returning to the issue in hand, which refers to the reliance on unmanned 
aerial vehicles for combat operations, this transformational technology will 
defi nitely change, if  it has not already done so, the way in which wars have been 
traditionally fought and won. And this -as it will be seen- has, of  course, a strong 
legal repercussion.
Taking all this into consideration, it is important to highlight that the aim of  
this paper is to examine and discuss if  the use of  drones, when countries argue 
that they are fi ghting against terrorism, validly fall within the scope of  application 
of  Article 51 of  the UN Charter. In other words, the purpose of  this article is to 
analyse if  the argument of  self-defence raised, mainly, by the US and its allies is 
a legal one when using unmanned aerial vehicles as a counter terrorism measure. 
In order to do so, the requirements established by the UN Charter, such as the 
principle of  proportionality, will be examined in detail. After such analysis, we will 
be able to conclude if  drones -when used as an offensive weapon to end the life of  
suspected terrorists- are or are not fulfi lling the legal requirements requested by the 
right of  self-defence, adjusting in the latter case the interpretation of  international 
law to the particular national interests of  some countries. In any case, before doing 
this, it is important to stress a few basic ideas/considerations that may give us a 
hint on the huge controversy that surrounds the use of  pilotless aircrafts in specifi c 
combat operations.
14 Targeted killings are seen as the main US strategy when fi ghting against terrorism, especially since 
the attacks of  9/11. Two examples of  this new trend is the effective killing of  Osama bin Laden in 
May 2011 and, a few months later, the drone strike addressed to Anwar al-Awlaki, an American-born 
Yemeni cleric and al-Qaeda propagandist.
15 The Commission issued a Communication, in April 2014, to enable the progressive integration of  
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems into the European civil airspace. Information hereby provided: <http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0207&from=EN>.
16 Ibidem.
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II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
WHEN PERPETRATING ARMED ATTACKS WITH UAS
President Bush alluded, during a speech made in December 2001, to the 
existence of  UAS as a vital and necessary military component that has changed 
radically the dimension of  the battlefi eld. The following words were pronounced 
just after the attacks of  9/11 within the context of  the confl ict of  Afghanistan: 
“The Predator is a good example. This unmanned aerial vehicle is able to circle 
over enemy forces, gather intelligence, transmit information instantly back to 
commanders, and then fi re on targets with extreme accuracy. Before the war, 
Predator had sceptics, because it did not fi t the old ways. Now it is clear the 
military does not have enough unmanned vehicles. We’re entering an era in which 
unmanned vehicles of  all kinds will take on greater importance”. Afghanistan is 
not the only country that has suffered the use of  unmanned aircrafts. Other areas, 
such as: Kosovo in 1999 or Iraq in 2003, have been affected in the recent past by 
the use of  this controversial military technology. Since then, an open discussion has 
appeared, as on the one hand -among numerous arguments17- scholars state that 
those  “[...] are arguably cheaper to procure, and they eliminate the risk to a pilot’s 
life”18 but, on the other hand, they cause civilian casualties becoming this a crucial 
issue that needs to be tackled seriously. In other words, it is important to mention 
that, according to many scholars, the use of  UAS can be extremely effective when 
trying to kill suspected terrorists; however, taking into account that the fi ght 
against terrorism is now seen as a global concern, several challenges and questions 
inevitably arise -despite the fact that transparency has been pledged by the current 
US President- when referring, in particular, to the targeted killings carried out by 
unmanned aerial vehicles.19 Those challenges are mainly linked with the killings of  
17 Another important argument is the following one: “autonomous weapons systems, by preventing 
casualties on their own side and simultaneously removing war and its more dramatic consequences 
from the meticulous and commonly not particularly benevolent media attention it otherwise receives, 
clearly reduce the “political cost” of  the use of  force”. Cfr. GUTIÉRREZ ESPADA, C., CERVELL HORTAL, 
M.J., “Autonomous weapons systems, drones and international law”, Revista del Instituto Español de 
Estudios Estratégicos, n. 2, 2013, 1-19, at 4.
18 Information hereby provided: <http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL31872.pdf>. Other arguments should 
be mentioned: “UAVs protect the lives of  pilots by performing the “3-D” missions - those dull, dirty, 
or dangerous missions that do not require a pilot in the cockpit. However, the lower procurement cost 
of  UAVs must be weighed against their greater proclivity to crash, while the minimized risk should 
be weighed against the dangers inherent in having an unmanned vehicle fl ying in airspace shared with 
manned assets”. Ibidem. 
19 This was said on 2013 in a speech made at the National Defense University. The following year, 
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civilians that drone strikes cause, emerging these combat operations as the current 
hallmark of  the US administration’s counterterrorism strategy.20
Moreover, the lack of  spatial closeness between the drone pilot and the drone 
(that is controlled remotely) does not challenge the attribution of  the specifi c act 
(the killings) to the State itself. The pilot is an organ of  the State as stated in Article 
4 of  the Draft on State Responsibility (2001)21.
Related to all the above, it is important to notice that, as a key outcome, there 
are many questions that remain unanswered in this area: Who can be considered an 
enemy combatant potentially subjected to be killed by a drone strike? Who is able 
to authorize those attacks? Are there geographical constraints when carrying out 
this kind of  operations? If  civilian casualties occur, who assumes responsibilities? 
Furthermore, can those attacks be considered as a violation of  international law? As 
previously said, the US Government has dramatically increased the use of  aircrafts 
without an on board pilot in these last years22, trying consequently -through the 
Justice Department- to provide answers to some of  the above questions. In this 
sense, it was said that three requirements had to be duly accomplished in order to 
lawfully use lethal force against a foreign country: 1) the targeted individual must 
pose an imminent threat; 2) the capture needs to be infeasible; and 3) the operation 
must be carried out in accordance with war principles.23
at the US Military Academy (West Point), President Barak Obama repeated the same idea: “[A]s I said 
last year, in taking direct action, we must uphold standards that refl ect our values. That means taking 
strikes only when we face a continuing, imminent threat, and only where [...] there is near certainty 
of  no civilian casualties, for our actions should meet a simple test: we must not create more enemies 
than we take off  the battlefi eld. I also believe we must be more transparent about both the basis of  
our counterterrorism actions and the manner in which they are carried out. We have to be able to 
explain them publicly, whether it is drone strikes or training partners.  [...] when we cannot explain 
our efforts clearly and publicly, we face terrorist propaganda and international suspicion, we erode 
legitimacy with our partners and our people and we reduce accountability in our own government. 
Information hereby provided: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-president-
obamas-commencement-address-at-west-point/2014/05/28/cfbcdcaa-e670-11e3-afc6-a1dd9407 
abcf_story.html>.
20 Information hereby provided: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/23/
obama-drone-speech-one-year-later>; <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/world/use-of-drones 
-for-killings-risks-a-war-without-end-panel-concludes-in-report.html?_r=1>. 
21 International Law Commission, Responsibility of  States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001 (Draft).
22 The New America Foundation states that, during the government of  the former US President, 
only 50 or less drone attacks took place in Pakistan, whereas the current US Head of  State has ordered 
more than 300. 
23 Document hereby provided: <http://fas.org/irp/eprint/doj-lethal.pdf>.
JACQUELINE HELLMAN – RAQUEL REGUEIRO
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 3, janvier-décembre 2015, pp. 143-164 149
Regarding the abovementioned criteria, which at fi rst sight could be seen as 
reasonable ones, thorny issues immediately emerge when analysing them in detail: 
how can it be determined the threat of  an imminent attack, taking into account that 
terrorists acts have normally a secret nature? The UN Charter refers to self-defence 
when a real harm takes place, but nothing is said about a potential one. The second 
requirement is also controversial, as the referred White Paper argues: “[...] capture 
would not be feasible if  it could not be physically effectuated during the relevant 
window of  opportunity or if  the relevant country were to decline to consent to a 
capture operation”. Within the context of  this paper, the last prerequisite acquires 
the greatest relevance, insofar it is linked with the fact that lethal operations carried 
out by the United States have to strictly “[...] comply with the four fundamental law-
of-war principles governing the use of  force: necessity, distinction, proportionality, 
and humanity (the avoidance of  unnecessary suffering).”24 Bearing this in mind, do 
drone strikes fulfi l this last condition even if  collateral damage takes place? In essence, 
is this third criterion not legally fulfi lled in case of  civilian casualties? If  so, which 
are the implications? Concerning this particular point, the above-mentioned White 
Paper states that “[...] it would not be consistent with those principles to continue 
an operation if  anticipated civilian casualties would be excessive in relation to the 
anticipated military advantage.”25 From our point of  view, the word “excessive” 
strongly deteriorates the US Government’s determination when complying with 
the referred requirements, as it constitutes a vague expression, potentially subjected 
to a wide or, even worse, malicious interpretation. In any event, the mentioned 
document emphasis the following idea: “[…] there is no prohibition under the laws 
of  war on the use of  technologically advanced weapons systems in armed confl ict-
such as pilotless aircraft or so-called smart bombs-as long as they are employed in 
conformity with applicable laws of  war.”26 Therefore, it is imperative to analyse the 
applicable regulation in order to determine if  drone strikes comply with the legal 
provisions. For that reason, as mentioned before, Article 51 of  the UN Charter will 
be analysed hereunder27.
24 Ibidem.
25 Vid. Supra. footnote 22.
26 Vid. Supra, footnote 22.
27 In either case, not all are legal considerations. Indeed, many people think that drone attacks are 
very unpopular as with the use of  this technology the fl ames of  anti-Americanism are fanned. Other 
criticisms are based on a lack of  transparency and information about how and on which legal bases 
targeted killings caused by drones take place.
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III. ANALYSING ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER
First of  all, we have to stress that drones are not a prohibited weapon under 
international law, which means that the lawfulness of  a response in self-defence 
using drones will be determined by the degree of  compliance with the requirements 
established by Article 51 of  the UN Charter: having suffered an armed attack for 
which a State can be held responsible and the response shall be immediate, necessary, proportional, 
temporary and subsidiary to the action decided by the UN Security Council (this body has 
to be informed of  the measures taken in self-defense; the Security Council is the 
main organ responsible for the maintenance of  international peace and security 
according to Article 24 of  the UN Charter).
In the light of  the above, we have to discuss how the right of  self-defence is 
affected by the “war against terrorism” declared by the United States and its allies 
against this unknown enemy that appeared in 2001. In the context of  this perpetual 
war, the use of  drones raises a specifi c relevance.
Moreover, it is important to mention that, despite of  the efforts made by 
scholars28 and international organizations29, there is no legal defi nition of  the word 
“terrorism”. Several international conventions30 state what a terrorist attack is but 
no consensus has been reached to defi ne the concept of  “terrorism”. The lack 
of  legal defi nition implies highlighting certain peculiarities when linking terrorism 
with the right of  self-defence.
28 Cfr. ALCAIDE FERNÁNDEZ, J., et. al, Las actividades terroristas ante el Derecho Internacional contemporáneo, 
Tecnos, Madrid, 2000, at 50; RAMÓN CHORNET, C., Terrorismo y respuesta de fuerza en el marco del Derecho 
Internacional, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, 1993, at 36-37; HOFFMAN, B., A mano armada. Historia del terrorismo, 
Editorial Espasa, Madrid, 1999, at 62-63; HIGGINS, R., “The general international law of  terrorism”, en 
HIGGINS, R., Y FLORY, M., Terrorism and International Law, London y New York, 1997, at 27.
29 Information hereby provided: A/57/270; A/RES/49/60; A/RES/56/88; A/59/565.
30 (1963) Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft, (1970) 
Convention for the Suppression of  Unlawful Seizure of  Aircraft, (1971) Convention for the Suppression 
of  Unlawful Acts against the Safety of  Civil Aviation, (1973) Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of  Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, (1979) International Convention 
against the Taking of  Hostages, (1980) Convention on the Physical Protection of  Nuclear Material, 
(1988) Convention for the Suppression of  Unlawful Acts against the Safety of  Maritime Navigation, 
(1988) Protocol for the Suppression of  Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of  Fixed Platforms Located 
on the Continental Shelf, (1991) Convention on the Marking of  Plastic Explosives for the Purpose 
of  Detection, (1997) International Convention for the Suppression of  Terrorist Bombings, (1999) 
International Convention for the Suppression of  the Financing of  Terrorism, (2005) International 
Convention for the Suppression of  Acts of  Nuclear Terrorism, (2010) Convention on the Suppression 
of  Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation
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1. ARMED ATTACK
Even though the particular interpretation made by the USA on their “war on 
terrorism”, the terrorist phenomenon as such does not give rise to the activation 
of  Article 51 of  the Charter. Indeed, terrorist acts are the ones that must be taken 
into account when assessing whether a State has or not the right to respond. The 
International Court of  Justice made it clear: “in the case of  individual self-defence, 
the exercise of  this right is subject to the State concerned having been the victim 
of  an armed attack.”31
Therefore, the relation between terrorism and the right of  self-defence must 
be based on the intensity of  the attack, seen from the perspective of  individual 
acts attributable to a State. It should be assessed whether the terrorist acts rise to 
the level of  suffi cient intensity and severity to qualify an armed attack within the 
meaning of  Article 51.32 That implies that its intensity and effects are such that they 
would be classifi ed as an armed attack if  they were carried out by regular armed 
forces.
2. ATTRIBUTABLE TO A STATE
Even if  the United States does not link the use of  drones for targeted killings 
with the international responsibility of  a specifi c State, the use of  armed forces 
without the consent of  the territorial State can only be justifi ed if  the latter has an 
international responsibility regarding the acts committed by these individuals (self-
defence). The draft of  the International Law Commission on State Responsibility33 
defi nes the attribution of  a particular conduct to a State. In regards of  terrorist 
attacks, Article 8 states that “the conduct of  a person or group of  persons shall 
be considered an act of  a State under international law if  the person or group of  
persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, 
that State in carrying out the conduct.”
Acting on the instructions requires that an organ of  the State, contracts or induces 
individuals or groups, who do not belong to the formal structure of  the state, to act 
31 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of  America). 
Merits, Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, § 195.
32 Ibidem.
33 Responsibility of  States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001, GA/RES/56/83, Annex.
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as auxiliary. The International Court of  Justice analysed this particular situation in 
the Nicaragua case: “the Court fi nds it established that, on a date in late 1983 or early 
1984, the President of  the United States authorized a United States government 
agency to lay mines in Nicaraguan ports; that in early 1984 mines were laid in or 
close to the ports of  El Bluff, Corinto and Puerto Sandino, either in Nicaraguan 
interna1 waters or in its territorial sea or both, by persons in the pay and acting on 
the instructions of  that agency, under the supervision and with the logistic support 
of  United States agents.”34
The second assumption of  attribution of  acts carried out by individuals to 
a State is when they act under its direction or control. Effective control is required 
according to the International Law Commission and the International Court of  
Justice: “The Court has taken the view that United States participation, even if  
preponderant or decisive, in the fi nancing, organizing, training, supplying and 
equipping of  the contras, the selection of  its military or paramilitary targets, and 
the planning of  the whole of  its operation, is still insuffi cient in itself, on the basis 
of  the evidence in the possession of  the Court, for the purpose of  attributing to the 
United States the acts committed by the contras in the course of  their military or 
paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. Al1 the forms of  United States participation 
mentioned above, and even the general control by the respondent state over a force 
with a high degree of  dependency on it, would not in themselves mean, without 
further evidence, that the United States directed or enforced the perpetration of  
the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by the applicant 
state. Such acts could well be committed by members of  the contras without the 
control of  the United States. For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility 
of  the United States, it would in principle have to be proved that that state had 
effective control of  the military or paramilitary operations in the course of  which 
the alleged violations were committed.”35
Following the declarations made by the International Court of  Justice, Lamberti 
states that “[…] the actions of  the armed groups must always be kept distinct from 
the acts of  assistance or acquiescence performed by the state. If  the armed groups 
act independently as private individuals, with no connection, even unoffi cial, with 
the military organization of  the state, and if  the state does no more that give 
34 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of  America). Merits, 
Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, § 80.
35 Ibid, § 115.
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various kinds of  assistance (organizational, fi nancial, military) or simply tolerate 
the presence of  these groups in its territory, the conduct of  armed bands cannot 
constitute an international wrongful act because it cannot be attributed to a state. 
The conduct of  the state is certainly unlawful under international law, but it is not 
itself  a use of  force, still less an armed attack in the sense of  Art. 51.”36
Thus, the attribution or terrorist acts to a State depends on the degree of  
involvement of  the same in the planning, preparation and execution of  the attacks. 
This participation must be important and fundamental for the reaching of  the 
pursued goal.
3. SAFE HAVENS
So, do we have to deny that providing a safe haven to terrorists does not 
activate the right of  self-defence? This point of  view is fought by most American 
scholars. Following the International Court of  Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the 
Wall in Palestinian Occupied Territory, Murphy argued that the Court’s interpretation 
implies that: 1) A State may provide or supply arms, logistical support and provide 
sanctuary to a terrorist group; 2) this group can infl ict violence of  any severity level 
to another State, even with weapons of  mass destruction; 3) the attacked State has 
no right to respond in self-defence because the assistance provided by the host 
State cannot be considered as an armed attack within the meaning of  Article 51 
of  the Charter; 4) the victim State cannot use self-defence against a terrorist group 
because this behaviour cannot be attributed to the host State if  there is no proof  
that a terrorist group was sent by the latter.37
Wedgwood argues that Article 51 is restricted to the armed attack perpetrated 
by one State against another. This does not fi t with the applicable international legal 
provisions, especially since 2001, when it was found that non-State actors can use 
force comparable to those State actors: “any use of  force by a private transnational 
terror network […] is illegal. But its illegality and qualifi cation as a war crime does 
not change the fact that it also constitutes an armed attack under Article 51.”38
36 Cfr. LAMBERTI ZANARDI, P.L., “Indirect Military Aggression”, in, CASSESE, A. (Ed.), The Current 
Legal Regulation of  the Use of  Force, Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, 1986, 
111-119, at 113.
37 MURPHY, S.D., “Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?”, 
American Journal of  International Law, Vol. 99, No. 1, 62-76, at 66; the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Israeli 
Security Fence and the Limits.
38 WEDGWOOD, R., “The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Security Fence and the Limits of  Self-
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Several UN resolutions stress there is an obligation for the States to refrain 
from organizing, tolerating, provoking or helping to realize acts of  terrorism 
against another State39. Thus, although constituting a violation of  the international 
obligation to refrain from tolerating terrorist activities in the territory of  the State, 
providing safe haven cannot be considered, however, as an armed attack according 
to Article 51 of  the UN Charter. The analysis of  international law and the practice 
of  the Security Council support this conclusion.40
4. IMMEDIACY
Article 51 of  the UN Charter is in the centre of  a doctrinal debate as to 
whether, beside the conventional rule that recognizes the inherent right of  self-
defence against an armed attack, a natural right of  self-defence recognized by 
customary international law remains with a more permissive content that authorizes 
the exercise of  anticipatory self-defence. There are two clearly opposing positions 
regarding the nature of  the right of  self-defence. According to Corten, points of  
view are more or less restrictive depending on the importance given to customary 
law.41
Indeed, scholars proposing an extensive approach based on the international 
custom consider the State practice as the main source of  the principle of  self-
defense, which implies that great importance is given to political decisions and the 
organs that take them. According to that, the principle would be formed according 
to the practice of  the most powerful States and will be in line with their interests. 
This entails in the same way that we will have to accept the possibility of  creating 
instant custom. Supporters of  the restrictive approach however put in the forefront 
the law, understood as the one formed both by custom and written law. Being the 
premise that States are equal in rights, the formal source has to change or new 
Defense”, American Journal of  International Law, Vol. 99, No. 1, 52-62, at 58; in the same way, see Ch. J. 
Tams, “Light Treatment of  a Complex Problem: The Law of  Self-Defense in the Wall Case”, European 
Journal of  International Law, 2005, vol. 16, nº5, 963-978.
39 Information hereby provided: UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV); UNGA Resolution 2734 (XXV).
40 GONZÁLEZ VEGA, J., “Los atentados del 11 de septiembre, la operación “Libertad duradera” y el 
derecho de legítima defensa”, Revista Española de Derecho Internacional, 2001, 247-271, at 255-256; in the 
same way, ACOSTA ESTÉVEZ, J. B., “La operación Libertad Duradera y la legítima defensa a la luz de los 
atentados del 11 de septiembre de 2001”, Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional, vol. VI, 2006, 13-61, 
at 40-41.
41 CORTEN, O., “The Controversies Over the Customary Prohibition on the Use of  Force: A 
Methodological Debate”, European Journal of  International Law (2005), vol. 16, No. 5, 803-822, at 804.
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custom has to be created for the law to evolve.
For the scholars that argue that the inherent right of  self-defence refers to 
the customary nature of  the right, prior to the adoption of  the UN Charter, the 
use of  self-defence was allowed for the protection of  nationals abroad, as well 
as an anticipatory self-defence. Thus, this doctrine assumes that under customary 
international law anticipatory self-defence is permitted against imminent danger. 
Therefore, the Webster doctrine allowing preventive action as self-defence was 
assimilated to an aspect of  the right of  self-preservation. For instance, Bowett 
argues that “action undertaken for the purpose of, and limited to, the defense of  
a State’s political independence, territorial integrity, the lives or property of  its 
nationals cannot by defi nition involve a threat or use of  force.”42 The author points 
out that although it is generally accepted that Article 51 incorporates the content 
of  self-defence under the Charter of  the United Nations, it can be argued that the 
customary right of  self-defence is in force for the member States of  the referred 
Organization: “We must presuppose that rights formerly belonging to member 
status continue except in so far as obligations inconsistent with those existing 
rights are assumed under the Charter […] It is, therefore, fallacious to assume that 
members have only those rights which the Charter accords to them; on the contrary 
they have those rights which general international law accords to them except and 
in so far as they have surrendered them under the Charter.”43
In addition, some authors recognize that there are situations in which it is 
possible to support a right of  self-defence against an imminent attack. Thus, as 
argued by Bowett or Waldock, the English sentence in Article 51 if  an armed attack 
occurs should not be interpreted as only if  an armed attack occurs since the Charter does 
not say the latter. Therefore, reactive self-defence, understood as a response to 
an armed attack, would be only one form of  self-defence allowed by the Charter. 
Another one would be anticipatory self-defence.44 However, the Charter does not 
say only if  an armed attack occurs nor or threatens. Therefore, other scholars argue 
that the right of  self-defence is applicable exclusively when there is a prior armed 
attack. As an exception to the prohibition of  the use of  force contained in Article 
42 Cfr. BOWETT, D., Self-Defense in International Law, New York, F.A. Praeger, cop. 1958, at 185-186.
43 Ibid. at 184-185.
44 Vid. KOLB, R., Ius contra bellum, Helbing & Lichtenhahn/Bruylant, Bâle-Genève-Munich/Bruxelles, 
2003., at 193, quoting C. H. M. Waldock, “The Regulation of  the Use of  Force by Individual States 
in International Law”, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International, Tome 81 II, 1952, 451-515, at 
497-498.
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2.4, legal provision 51 has to be interpreted narrowly. The limits of  self-defence in 
Article 51 would be meaningless if  a broader interpretation was retained. They also 
claim that before the Charter, customary law allowed uniquely a restricted right of  
self-defence.45
Following this reasoning, self-defence was conceived as an exception to the 
prohibition in Article 2.4; therefore, it is an exceptional right, a privilege. Indeed, 
the aim of  the referred Charter is the use of  force to be under the control of  the 
Organization -monitored, in particular, by the Security Council- and, says Brownlie, 
proof  of  that is the requirements of  temporality and subsidiarity, as well as the 
obligation for the State to inform the Council immediately.46 Another argument 
would be that, since the use of  armed force was not forbidden by the classical 
international law, conventional nor customary law, both aggression and the use of  
force were legitimate without being relevant if  they were conducted for offensive 
or defensive purposes. Consequently, a rule authorizing the use of  force in self-
defence (such as Article 51) only makes sense if  that use is prohibited.47 That is what 
ruled the International Law Commission: “The absolutely indispensable premise 
for the admission of  a self-contained concept of  self-defence, with its intrinsic 
meaning, into a particular system of  law is that the system must have contemplated 
as a general rule the general prohibition of  the use of  force by private subjects and 
hence admits the use of  force only in cases where it would have purely and strictly 
defensive objectives, in other words, in cases where the use of  force would take 
the form of  resistance to a violent attack by another. Another element —which, 
in logic, is not so indispensable as the foregoing, but has been confi rmed in the 
course of  history as its necessary complement — is that the use of  force, even for 
strictly defensive purposes, is likewise admitted not as a general rule, but only as 
an exception to a rule under which a central authority has a monopoly or virtual 
45 Vid. BROWNLIE, I., International Law and the Use of  Force by States, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1963 (repr. 2002), at 264 and following; Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, “International Law in the Past 
Third of  a Century”, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International de La Haye, Tome 159, 1978-I, 
9-343, at 96 and following; J. L. Kunz, “Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of  the 
Charter of  the United Nations”, American Journal of  International Law, Vol. 41, 1947, 872-879, at 878; M. 
Bothe, “Terrorism and the Legality of  Pre-emptive Force”, European Journal of  International Law, 2003, 
vol. 14, nº 2, at 227-240.
46 Ibid. at 273-274.
47 Vid. PASTOR RIDRUEJO, J. A., Curso de Derecho Internacional Público y Organizaciones Internacionales, 14ª 
edición, Tecnos, Madrid, 2010, at 624; REMIRO BROTÓNS, A., et al., Derecho internacional. Curso General, 
Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia, 2010, at 672.
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monopoly on the use of  force so as to guarantee respect by all for the integrity of  
others.”48
The International Law Commission’s reasoning implies that, having legally 
regulated self-defence, the Charter excludes any other concept more permissive 
to authorize its use for preventive purposes. The International Court of  Justice 
confi rmed the narrow concept of  self-defence in the mentioned Nicaragua case: 
“[The] reference to customary law is contained in the actual text of  Article 5 
1, which mentions the “inherent right” (in the French text “droit naturel”) of  
individual or collective self-defence, which “nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair” and which applies in the event of  an armed attack. The Court therefore 
fi nds that Article 51 of  the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is a 
“natural” or “inherent” right of  self-defence and it is hard to see how this can be 
other than of  a customary nature, even if  its present content has been confi rmed 
and infl uenced by the Charter. Moreover the Charter, having itself  recognized the 
existence of  this right, does not go on to regulate directly all aspects of  its content. 
In the case of  individual self-defence, the exercise of  this right is subject to the 
state concerned having been the victim of  an armed attack”.49
In regards to drones, Gutiérrez Espada and Cervell Hortal seem to suggest that 
the leader targeted by a drone should be the leader of  an actual on going attack; 
if  so, the drone strike could be justifi ed by the right of  self-defence.50 We must 
disagree with this interpretation. A pre-emptive response is a legitimate response to 
an aggression that is about to take place. The test of  the armed attack under Article 
51 of  the UN Charter would be fulfi lled in cases where the attack is imminent and 
there is certainty about its happening. Pre-emptive self-defence is always lawful. 
Nonetheless, when the United States argue that they act in self-defence in Pakistan, 
they understand that these actions are taken in order to prevent further attacks. 
It is diffi cult to meet the requirement of  immediacy when self-defence is used in 
response to terrorist attacks because these are characterized by immediacy in its 
execution. The consensus shown by the international community in 2001 to accept 
the US right of  self-defence lasted what the shock for the events lasted. Although 
48 Report of  the International Law Commission on the work of  its Thirty-second session, 5 May 
- 25 July 1980, Offi cial Records of  the General Assembly, Thirty-fi fth session, Supplement No. 10 
(A/35/10).
49 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of  America). Merits, 
Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, § 80.
50 Vid. GUTIÉRREZ ESPADA, C., Y CERVELL HORTAL, M. J., op. cit., at 19.
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it was thought that the acceptance of  the quasi-unanimity of  the states induced 
to think that a new international custom was being conceived, this conclusion 
has not been confi rmed for several reasons. One of  them is that the response of  
the coalition that intervened in Afghanistan was so disproportionate (coming to 
overthrow the Taliban government) that many countries raised their voices and 
stopped supporting the intervention. In addition, the reaction of  the international 
community was not similar regarding other terrorist attacks (for instance, in Madrid, 
London or Bali).
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, in 2001, was launched to prevent 
and avoid terrorist attacks in the future. So, according to the United States, there was 
a risk of  repetition of  such actions that required defensive measures. If  we consider 
that there was a chain of  attacks on going, this argument could be accepted; several 
attacks launched in a reasonable period of  time and against the same target (a State) 
could be accepted as an ongoing armed attack. But in 2001, there were no further 
attacks coming. Neither are they in Yemen or Pakistan. It is diffi cult to believe 
that future actions are part of  a chain of  attacks, which would be characterized by 
temporal proximity in their development. Moreover, it is mandatory to determine 
which one is the fi rst attack from which to start counting.
If  anticipatory self-defence is diffi cult to sustain, much more complex is to 
do so regarding a posteriori self-defence. If  we use the following example given 
by Kretzmer, we can analyse self-defence a posteriori: “In November 2002 a car 
travelling in a remote part of  Yemen was destroyed by a missile fi led from an 
unmanned Predator drone. Six people in the car, all suspected members of  al-
Qaeda, were killed. While the US did not publicly acknowledge responsibility for 
the attack, offi cials let it be known that the CIA had carried it out. One of  the men 
killed, Qaed Salim Sinan al Harethi, was said to be a former bin Laden security 
guard who was suspected of  playing a major role in the October 2000 attack on the 
US destroyer Cole, in which 17 sailors were killed.”51
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States declared 
that they should use the right to exercise self-defence a posteriori. A month 
after, a letter was sent to the Security Council by the US government, stating the 
following: “since 11 September, my Government has obtained clear and compelling 
51 Cfr. KRETZMER, D., “Targeted Killing of  Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or 
Legitimate Means of  Defence?”, European Journal of  International Law, 2005, Vol. 16 No. 2, 171-212, at 
171-172.
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information that the Al-Qaeda organization, which is supported by the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan, had a central role in the attacks. There is still much we 
do not know. Our inquiry is in its early stages. We may fi nd that our self-defence 
requires further actions with respect to other organizations and other states.” The 
American declaration has been regarded as a wilful and contra legem interpretation 
of  the right of  self-defence.52
The American statement raises some questions. The fi rst one is that self-
defence can be invoked in the future. Therefore, it is not alleged in reference to 
an actual armed attack but against an armed attack that has already happened and 
ended. This leads to the lack of  temporal connection between the attack and the 
response in self-defence. In this case we would forget the customary requirement 
of  immediacy, delaying the response until the State attacked sometime before 
decides -subjectively, of  course- that it is time to fi ght back.
What self-defence a posteriori actually advocates is that any armed attack by one 
State against another would be likely to receive a response ad infi nitum. And how 
would we evaluate this? Until fi ve years later? Until ten years later? For example, 
would it be considered lawful today a US response against Pakistan because of  that 
country’s alleged involvement in the attacks of  11 September 2001? Certainly not.
So, when the United States argues being acting in self-defence for the targeting 
and killing of  an Al-Qaeda leader, even if  this individual played a major role in a 
terrorist attack carried out more than 10 years ago, there is no right to exercise 
self-defence. In fact, that should be considered as a retaliation measure prohibited 
by international law. Kretzmer provides us with another example of  self-defence 
using drones: “The [US] Yemen attack came two years after Israel adopted a policy 
of  ‘targeted killings’ of  Palestinians alleged to be active members of  terrorist 
organizations involved in organizing, promoting or executing terrorist attacks in 
Israel and the Occupied Territories. This policy commenced with the attack on 
Hussein ‘Abayat and was followed by a series of  attacks culminating recently in 
the attacks on the Hamas leaders Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz Rantisi. In many 
of  these attacks innocent bystanders were killed or wounded. This policy has 
been offi cially acknowledged and is at the time of  writing being defended by the 
52 Vid. VALLARTA MARRÓN, J. L., “El derecho inmanente a la legítima defensa individual o colectiva 
en caso de ataque armado. ¿Se justifi ca una interpretación extensiva para incluir medidas preventivas 
y punitivas? Una visión israelí”, Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional, vol. IX, 2009, 69-115, at 97.
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government before the Supreme Court of  Israel.”53 The Israeli policy of  targeted 
killings cannot be justifi ed with Article 51. The International Court of  Justice made 
clear that the Israeli argument of  being acting in self-defence failed because of  
the lack of  the international element of  the armed attack and, since a State cannot 
invoke the right of  self-defence against himself, the Israeli arguments were not 
acceptable. Indeed, the Palestinian territory is an occupied territory and, therefore, its 
administration is under Israeli control.54
In regards of  the actions of  Israel in Lebanon against Hezbollah, the attribution 
of  the Hezbollah actions to the Lebanese government remains doubtful. Hezbollah 
is not a de jure an organ of  the Lebanese State, nor could Lebanon be attributed 
a responsibility on the basis of  an organic de facto relationship. Cannizzaro denies 
that Hezbollah may have a suffi cient degree of  autonomy to be considered a 
subject of  international law because to do so, it should exercise exclusive control 
of  the territory as well as being comparable to a new territorial entity possessing 
sovereignty. Therefore, there should have been a process of  insurrection and 
authorities should have had provided some stability in that territory. Clearly, this 
is not the case of  Lebanon, whose unity was never contested.55 Consequently, 
the Israeli use of  drones against Hezbollah leaders follows the same reasoning 
mentioned above.
IV. IS THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY DULY ACCOMPLISHED?
When trying to determine if  the legal provision 51 of  the UN Charter is being 
duly satisfi ed or not, it is crucial not only to examine the above legal aspects, but 
also the following criterion of  fairness and justice: the principle of  proportionality. 
Why is the mentioned principle a basic element when applying article 51?
As suggested by Aurescu, the proportionality of  the reaction in self-defense 
has two dimensions56. The fi rst one, “quantitative”, expresses a correspondence 
between the gravity of  the attack suffered and the scale of  the reaction, which 
53 Cfr. KRETZMER, D., op. cit., at 172.
54 Legal Consequences of  the Construction of  a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I. 
C. J. Reports 2004, p. 136, § 139.
55 Vid. CANNIZZARO, E., “Entités non-étatiques et régime international de l’emploi de la force. Une 
étude sur le cas de la réaction israélienne au Liban », Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 2007, vol. 
111, nº2, 333-352, at 335.
56 Vid. AURESCU, B., “Le confl it libanais de 2006. Une analyse juridique à la lumière de tendances 
contemporaines en matière de recours à la force”, Annuaire Français de Droit International, LII, 2006, p. 
154.
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must be limited in its object to the restoring of  the existing situation before the 
aggression. On the other hand, the “qualitative” dimension was analyzed by the 
International Court of  Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of  the Threat 
or Use of  Nuclear Weapons: the use of  armed force in self-defense has to meet the 
requirements of  the law applicable to armed confl icts. Therefore, self-defense 
might not authorize the use of  means that are opposite to the principles and the 
content of  International Humanitarian Law57.
This principle of  proportionality entails that the impact of  retaliation measures 
has to be evaluated. A similar idea is contained in an open-letter written in 2003 
by Moreno Ocampo, the former Chief  Prosecutor of  the International Court of  
Justice: “(...) A crime occurs if  there is an intentional attack directed against civilians 
(principle of  distinction) (...) or an attack is launched on a military objective in the 
knowledge that the incidental civilian injuries would be clearly excessive in relation 
to the anticipated military advantage (principle of  proportionality)58”.
Be that as it may, when considering if  the right of  self-defence has been 
breached it is crucial to combine the interpretation of  the above principle with 
another one: the principle of  necessity, which implies that the use of  force must be 
consistent with the achievement of  legitimate military objectives. Therefore, these 
two principles have to be duly respected when exercising the right of  self-defence. 
Not doing this will entail the violation of  international legal provisions. In this 
regard, we should mention that Israel has been accused of  not fulfi lling those in, 
among others, the attack launched in Gaza in 2006 after an Israelite soldier was 
captured.
Returning to our topic, when using drones, we have seen that civilian casualties 
take place. In this regard, we have to mention what Human Rights Watch has 
said: “the impact on civilians must be carefully weighed under the principle of  
proportionality against the military advantage served; all ways of  minimizing the 
impact on civilians must be considered; and attacks should not be undertaken if  
the civilian harm outweighs the defi nite military advantage, or if  a similar military 
advantage could be secured with less civilian harm”.59 Thus, when pilotless aircrafts 
are injuring or killing civilians, article 51 of  the UN Charter is frontally violated.
57 Legality of  the Threat or Use of  Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226.
58 This letter was published during the Irak invasion of  2003.
59 This idea has been posed by Human Rights Watch in the following document: <http://www.hrw.
org/news/2006/08/01/questions-and-answers-hostilities-between-israel-and-hezbollah>.
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Without doubt, the abovementioned principle is interlocked with human rights 
regulation when it refers to the killings of  civilians. Along the same line, Philip 
Alston understands that “[...] the legality of  a killing outside the context of  armed 
confl ict is governed by human rights standards, especially those concerning the use 
of  lethal force […]. [A] targeted killing in the sense of  an intentional, premeditated 
and deliberate killing by law enforcement offi cials cannot be legal because, unlike 
in armed confl ict, it is never permissible for killing to be the sole objective of  
an operation”60. Thus, airstrikes that have perpetrated targeted killings and caused 
death, in a non-armed confl ict area, must be subjected to the application of  relevant 
legal provisions, such as: Article 3 of  the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights 
(UDHR), Article 6 of  the ICCPR, Article 2 of  the European Convention for the 
Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, etc.
The last legal document above mentioned contemplates the possibility of  a 
legitimate use of  force provided that the principle of  proportionality is duly 
complied. Regarding the issue here discussed, problems arise when acknowledging 
that drone strikes always occur far beyond the borders of  the country that has 
ordered the attack. Thus, as explained before, can the use of  force be legal if  it is 
perpetrated in another State unable to pursue the crimes itself  or unwilling to help 
the State of  the victim? Forgetting sovereign considerations, can we understand 
that the victim State has no other possibility but to display its force against the 
suspected terrorist? As Kretzmer suggests, “[…] it could not do so if  its aim were 
to punish the suspected terrorist for past acts or to deter potential terrorists from 
acting”61. This is obvious. However, as the author argues, what will happen if  a 
State has evidence that the alleged terrorist is planning an attack against people in 
its territory? Within this context, is the use of  force absolutely necessary?62 It does 
not seem like it. In this respect, a suitable question should be taken into account: 
“how can one decide if  lethal force is necessary to prevent a possible future attack 
about which one knows nothing?”63 Either way, we must highlight that regarding 
the ICCPR, no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of  his life. Therefore, can a pre-
emptive attack be considered as an arbitrary life deprivation? In this regard, the 
Human Rights Committee declares the following: “The Committee is concerned by 
60 See paragraph 33. 
61 Cfr. KRETZMER, D, op. cit., at 179.
62 Ibid. at 180.
63 Cfr. BROOKS, B., op. cit., at 21.
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what the State party calls ‘targeted killings’ of  those identifi ed by the State party as 
suspected terrorists in the Occupied Territories. This practice would appear to be 
used at least in part as a deterrent or punishment, thus raising issues under article 
6 [...]. The State party should ensure that the utmost consideration is given to the 
principle of  proportionality in all its responses to terrorist threats and activities. 
State policy in this respect should be spelled out clearly in guidelines to regional 
military commanders, and complaints about disproportionate use of  force should 
be investigated promptly by an independent body. Before resorting to the use of  
deadly force, all measures to arrest a person suspected of  being in the process of  
committing acts of  terror must be exhausted”64.
Consequently, the Committee argues that the use of  force should be 
considered as a strategy of  last resort. Therefore, States have to ensure that the 
basic rights of  persons within its jurisdiction are duly protected. This, of  course, 
includes territories under its occupation or control. At the same time, they have 
to implement counterterrorism measures to prevent, among others, instability. 
In parallel, the strategies implemented when fi ghting against terrorism have to 
successfully overcome the test of  proportionality and necessity. All this previous 
considerations provide a challenging and complex scenario diffi cult to solve in a 
dramatic real-life event, in particular when drones are used.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The use of  drones for extrajudicial targeted killings during the permanent 
war against terrorism implemented by the United States and some of  its allies 
to different groups since 2001, hardly fi ts the requirements of  the right of  self-
defense (Article 51) alleged by the perpetrators.
The lack of  legal defi nition on terrorism implies that the phenomenon (terrorism) 
is not the enemy; to raise a response in self-defense, terrorist acts are the ones that 
should be taken into consideration. These acts, under certain circumstances, could 
reach the level of  intensity necessary to be qualifi ed as an armed attack according 
to Article 51 but their attribution to a particular State is diffi cult to establish; the 
groups or individuals targeted by drones are not acting on behalf  of  a public 
authority nor on the instructions or the effective control of  any specifi c State.
64 See Concluding Observations of  the Human Rights Committee: Israel. Available at: <http://adalah.
org/upfi les/ConcludingObservations/HRC-Concluding%20Observations%20(2003).pdf>.
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Regarding the condition of  immediacy of  the response in self-defense, the 
use of  drones is not a response to any specifi c attack; the argument to be in “war 
against terrorism” hampers the acceptance of  self-defense: there is no response, 
there is a war.
However, even recognizing there is a war, is it highly doubtful that the use 
of  drones for targeted killings respects the law applicable to armed confl icts 
and particularly International Humanitarian Law (another requirement for self-
defense). The amount of  civilian casualties shows that this “collateral damage” is 
clearly excessive in relation with the anticipated military advantage. Moreover, if  
proportionality is not respected, neither is necessity; targeted extrajudicial killings 
of  individuals suspected to be terrorists entailing per se the killing of  civilian hardly 
harmonizes with the achievement of  legitimate military objectives.
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